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The Impact of Economic Efficiency on Employment 
A Case Study of Mergers & Acquisitions 
 
Anca D Chirita 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to challenge the present rhetoric used by competition policy makers and 
enforcers when advancing economic efficiency as a goal of competition policy. The fixation 
on the promotion of economic efficiency and intense or fierce competition comes at the 
expense of other sensible social values, such as job creation. This trend of modern 
competition policy is based on a reductionist assumption about how markets work in 
practice. In particular, it is firmly believed that promoting efficiency will lead to inefficient 
market players leaving the market. This policy, however, reveals its own fallacy. The exit of 
larger, or the merger of smaller businesses, is often associated with their downsizing or 
restructuring and, as a result, with job losses. 
A dogmatic application of competition policy serving economic calculus, rather than the 
social order, has silently ignored the negative impact of competition on wages and 
employment. Over the past many years of successful enforcement of competition laws, no 
attempts have been made to reverse the negative social impact that has been inflicted by 
fierce and aggressive forms of competition. One way of curbing the negative impact of 
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aggressive forms of competition could be through job creation, for example, instead of a fine 
imposed on corporations that breach competition rules, by offering a reduction based on the 
number of jobs that are newly created. 
By revisiting the classical price and wage efficiency theoretic assumptions, this paper 
challenges the use of the ‘efficiency’ benchmark at both micro- (industrial organization) and 
macroeconomic levels. The case study of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) across several 
sectors of the economy will be used to demonstrate how internal growth and merger-specific 
efficiencies – some of which include the elimination of labour costs - affect wage efficiency 
and employment prospects. While 6.5% out of 3.7 million jobs losses as a result of M&A 
activity during a four-year period does not seem to have created a major macroeconomic 
imbalance, a closer look at recent M&A trends during 2013-2016 demonstrates that, indeed, 
job losses far outweigh the balance of job creation. 
Ultimately, if efficiency always translates into the destruction of jobs, why should it, then, 
be afforded such a prominent role in any competition policy rhetoric? This paper will 
challenge the well-established assumption that ‘new jobs replace old jobs’ following a 
successful merger. This false assumption is basically at odds with the fact that the majority of 
European Union mergers are approved, even if subject to conditions, leaving an insignificant 
percentage of mergers blocked since 1990 (24 or 0.3%).  
 
II. From Classical to Modern Price versus Wage Efficiency Intricacies 
 
Reflecting on the complex relationship between market price and wages, Adam Smith offers 
the example of monopolists who ‘by keeping the market constantly under-stocked’ do not 
meet actual demand so that they can sell well above the ‘natural’ price of free competition, 
and later raise wages or profits ‘greatly above their natural rate’.1 These days, it is not 
surprising to see popular brands disappearing from supermarket shelves only to have their 
prices pushed up. However, while higher prices will be channelled towards higher corporate 
profits, they do not necessarily lead to higher wages for workers.  
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Moving on from this classical example offered by Adam Smith, a contemporary example of 
a contrasting real-life scenario is offered by the European Commissioner for Competition, Ms 
Vestager, when talking about the over-capacity of the steel industry. This industry went 
through a painful process of restructuring to make its business more competitive.2 In the 
context of state aid, granting national subsidies to maintain over-capacity in the Italian steel 
sector was seen as effectively putting ‘other steelworkers’ jobs at risk across Europe’.  The 
above example offers conclusive evidence of the close, but inverse, relationship that exists 
between (lower) price efficiency and job security. 
In contrast to harmful monopolies, which maintain artificially high prices above those that 
could arise from competition under free markets, fierce competition delivers the lowest 
possible price. Naturally arising lower prices are an efficient market outcome. As mentioned 
earlier, higher corporate profits might negatively affect wages if corporations become too 
greedy to invest in human resources and choose not to contribute towards better wages. 
Alternatively, lower prices could lead to overproduction and possibly lower corporate profits, 
which could make the social impact on wages much worse. 
The ideal of price efficiency can be reached only through vigorous competition. The same 
game of competition drives labour markets and, implicitly, the ideal of wage efficiency.3 In 
this context, Smith recalls the ‘exclusive privileges of corporations,’ as well as of employment 
laws, which could restrain labour market competition ‘to a smaller number than might 
otherwise go into them’. Depicted as ‘enlarged monopolies’, by making employment 
opportunities available to only a select category of individuals, the relevant market price was 
kept above the natural price of free market competition, as were the wages of the employed 
labour and monopolistic corporate profits.  
The overarching concept of efficiency works differently for market prices and wages. If one 
were to employ the same natural level for labourers’ wages as for the natural market price, 
the lowest market price would be on a par with the lowest possible living wage for 
individuals. For example, Ricardo’s concept of the ‘original state of efficiency’ considers 
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primarily the costs associated with ‘paying the wages for the labour’ necessary for the 
production of goods, which makes the trade surplus, i.e., profit, dependent on ‘efficiency 
wages’ minus additional expenses.4 Were such labour costs lower than they should be, then 
the monopolists could add another monopoly margin to those extracted from the overpriced 
sale of goods. 
The ideals of efficiency inherent in each of the two scenarios explained above stand 
diametrically opposed to each other. It does not follow that monopolies are bad for prices 
but good for wages. On the contrary, while monopolies might preserve monopoly rents for a 
select group of shareholders, the wider public trusts that these monopolistic entities create 
and secure jobs for the economy at large. Out of sentimentality, there is public sympathy 
towards monopolists should a fine imposed on them be perceived to lead, immediately, to 
job losses; giants such as Google or Apple are obvious examples these days. In contrast, there 
is no outcry when a smaller or medium-sized firm exits the market, because their business is 
not regarded publicly as a success story; it is not seen as something that could adversely 
affect employment at large. 
As will be examined in the following sections, the merger of powerful corporations might 
lead to a monopolistic constellation. Therefore, the practical question to be asked is whether 
the market price will be moving towards the efficiency ideal and, if so, how this will, in turn, 
affect wages, or whether the underlying rationale for merging is simply reducing labour costs. 
In principle, it is assumed that mergers bring about external growth and new jobs. Ultimately, 
efficiency arguments could twist the outcome of a merger towards jobs losses.  
 
III. Efficiency as a Goal of Competition Policy 
 
There are conflicting views on the many goals that competition policy has embraced over 
time. There is more than one goal that deserves attention. Policy makers often state which 
goal takes precedence at a given time. Thus, previous European Union’s commissioners for 
competition have projected various goals of European competition law. Amongst the many 
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past goals, market integration, economic efficiency, consumer welfare and, recently, the 
social market economy have gradually grown in substance over the years. 
The fact that goals conflict with each other is nothing new. Kaysen and Turner argued in 
favour of a hierarchy of goals considering both the ‘limitation of market power’ and the 
achievement of ‘desirable economic performance’. They suggested that ‘in so far as 
reduction of market power is incompatible with efficiency and progressiveness’, the first goal 
is subordinate to the second.5 Therefore, efficiency is best seen as an instrument to achieve 
economic progress.  
For Kaysen and Turner, there should be no competition intervention that could make a few 
efficient firms exercise their own market power where the cost of intervention could see a 
‘substantial loss in efficiency’. Nonetheless, ‘where market power exists and can be reduced 
without sacrifices in performance, then such action is desirable without reference to the 
question of how good over-all performance may have been’.  
It is difficult to predict in advance how competition intervention against monopolistic 
giants could worsen the quality or the performance of the products concerned. 
Retrospectively, one could assess, for example, whether the intervention against Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer has, indeed, made the browser more efficient. The positive side of that 
intervention is that, indeed, it did open up the market for browsers. 
It has been advanced that, when drafting the Sherman Act, the US Congress intended 
primarily to encourage redistribution, not efficiency.6 The former interpretation endorses the 
consideration of ‘equity’7 as a legitimate concern of antitrust laws that are called upon to 
improve the distribution of income, thereby addressing the increasing inequality due to the 
‘large scale accumulation of wealth’.8  
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However, critics expressed concern over the incentive cost of redistribution,9 while others 
suggested taxation as a better avenue for dealing with distribution.10 For example, Kaplow 
argued that 
‘because we tax more heavily those who earn more income and subsidize individuals 
through transfer programs to the extent they earn less income, the tax and the transfer 
system creates incentives to reduce labour effort, which is inefficient.’11 
From the above, it follows that redistribution could be socially costly and remains only a 
second-best choice. Indeed, the Congress aimed to prevent ‘unfair transfers of wealth from 
consumers to firms with market power’. This had been understood in the sense that the 
objective of antitrust law is ‘essentially a political rather than an economic enterprise’.12 
Nonetheless, Hofstadter identified social goals of antitrust measures alongside economic, 
political, and moral goals. Oberschall and Leifer raised yet another interesting issue on the 
use by sociologists of the term ‘function’, instead of ‘goal’, as something which is sought to 
be accomplished.13 
It is rather unfortunate that subsequent government administrations often chose to ignore 
social goals in the interpretation of the US Sherman Act.14 Following a similar critical line on 
the legacy of the Reagan administration, Broder noted that the enforcement of mergers was 
then no longer hostile towards ‘potentially troublesome mergers and acquisitions’, having as 
a consequence that antitrust enforcers helped the transactions in question to go ahead.15 
Neither did the Bush administration make any attempt to block mergers.16 
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As Foer explained, the justification for this deliberate exclusion of social goals tied to 
political ones was based on the perception of subjectivity, which could later be negatively 
affixed to antitrust decision-making.17  
However, it is no longer possible to validly claim enforcing antitrust laws solely with 
objective economic criteria in mind means that kind of enforcement would always be 
effective in eliminating various biases or even a misuse of economic theories. The salience of 
economics should not make sociological factors less valuable for the modern analysis of 
antitrust laws. As Duesenberry once noted, ‘Economics is all about why people make choices, 
while sociology is all about why they don’t have any choices to make’.18 By paying attention to 
the socio-economic factors that could adversely affect social welfare, antitrust enforcement 
could better service the public, rather than corporate interests. 
It has been argued elsewhere19 that the congressional debates on both the Sherman and 
the Clayton Acts do not reveal any interest in efficiency as an objective of antitrust policy. 
Indeed, making efficiency the goal of antitrust ‘may signify a false consensus’.20 In contrast, 
Bork famously stirred up controversy by arguing that the task of antitrust law has to be seen 
as an ‘effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly so as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare’.21 Otherwise, 
antitrust laws could negatively affect consumer welfare. Despite his nebulous use of 
‘consumer welfare’, Bork succeeded in imposing22 it as a legitimate, even if unwritten, goal of 
the US antitrust law. 
Attempting to place efficiency in a wider context of market outcomes, modern industrial 
organization refers to a situation where ‘it is impossible to find some small change in the 
allocation of capital, labor, goods or services that would improve the well-being of one 
individual in the market without hurting any other’.23 From the perspective of firms producing 
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goods or offering services, measuring their own price efficiency is something that looks 
primarily at the difference between the maximum amount a consumer could spend and the 
actual price that the consumer ultimately pays. Similarly, if one seeks to measure labour 
efficiency for the other side of the market, then firms will have to look at the maximum and 
minimum salary which could be paid to maximize profits. Therefore, an evaluation of 
efficiency as desired by firms clashes with the pursuit of efficiency as a market outcome 
servicing the public at large. 
In the probability of a merger scenario, competition authorities engage with a long 
established analysis to determine the kind of efficiencies brought about by the merger itself. 
It is, however, assumed that if the merger will lead to a reduction in variable costs, this will 
create an incentive for the merged entity to subsequently reduce prices to the benefit of 
consumers. Commentators have suggested that any reductions in fixed costs, including cuts 
in the number of office staff, will not adversely affect pricing.24 Most of the so-called 
‘efficiencies’ brought about by a merger have to be ‘specific’, i.e., any reductions in costs 
have to be the result of the merger and be verifiable, and must benefit consumers.25 These 
efficiencies reduce production costs per unit. It is believed that this will later increase the 
margins and offer the company involved an incentive to reduce the unit price.26 While the 
whole process will benefit final consumers through further price reductions, it becomes 
nonetheless clear that 
‘many mergers are allegedly beneficial because of their elimination of all sort of 
redundancies, which very often include labor. Unemployment compensation and related costs 
are externalities of such mergers that are unrecognised in the antitrust analysis’.27 
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Also, it can be recognised that there are many other efficiencies stemming, for example, 
the specialisation of labour, i.e., workers are able to perform certain tasks more efficiently; 
the operation of higher capacity equipment which requires less labour,28 or as a result of 
sharing managerial or sales expertise.29 
Leaving aside the resultant price efficiency, this positive side of mergers comes at the 
expense of considerable staff redundancies and, as a result, job losses. To date, there is 
limited empirical research on the negative effect of mergers on job prospects in the long run. 
It has been argued that, after the implementation of a merger, the merged entity has to 
strike a difficult balance between the need to reduce labour costs and the need to minimise 
workplace disruptions.30 The common belief is that implementing job cuts could see the 
merged entity having its own performance adversely affected due to a potentially very high 
staff turnover. However, this phenomenon was common in the US commercial banking 
industry where aggressive staff replacements took place with the aim of reducing labour 
costs. 
Of course, there is further scope for achieving efficiency following the elimination of 
duplicate job descriptions. However, any cuts of previously available jobs means an 
increasing burden on existing employees. Other exceptional cases have emerged in the 
process of privatisation where outdated technologies had to be eliminated and, as a 
consequence, many jobs were lost. In the long run, other jobs have also been created, 
making the previous losses a painful, but short-term, economic shock. 
 
IV. An Assessment of the Impact of Mergers & Acquisitions on Employment 
 
This section seeks to examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on employment. As 
mentioned earlier, there is a gap in the empirical literature on this issue. Drawing on the 
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efforts of a previous study31 on the negative consequences of mergers and acquisitions, 
which highlighted large scale job losses, the European Restructuring Monitor identified 3.7 
million job losses as a result of the restructuring activity undertaken during 2002 to 2007. 
Approximately 6.5% of these job losses were caused by mergers and acquisitions, that is, 
240,000 jobs during a five-year period. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
2007 2002-
2007 
6.6 2.9 3.8 5.3 11 9.9 6.5 
 
Some of the high profile cases of job losses involved various sectors of the economy from 
pharmaceuticals, oil, steel, telecommunications, banking, to the automobile industry. 
Prominent examples are, for example, the acquisition of Schering by Bayer with nearly 5,350 
job cuts, of which 3,150 were in Europe; Statoil-Norsk Hydro, with 3,500 redundancies; 
Arcelor and Mittal Steel, with 2,700 direct and 2,280 indirect job losses; 1,000 jobs at Neuf 
Telecom and Cegetel; 2,600 jobs at ABN AMRO and Royal Bank of Scotland/Fortis/Banco 
Santander; 7,500 jobs at Fortis bank; 11,300 jobs at Renault and Automobile Dacia; and 2,250 
jobs at Boots and Alliance UniChem. 
Drawing on the data provided by the European Union Restructuring Monitor, the table 
below identifies the type of restructuring activities involving mergers and acquisitions in 
Europe. The data highlight the creation of any planned jobs against imminent job losses. For 
the period under review of just four years, the results show that only 1,420 new jobs had 
been created for 56,703 job cuts, that is, one newly created job for every 40 job cuts. This 
result challenges the previously held assumption that mergers and acquisitions are positive in 
the sense that they bring about economic growth and therefore better job prospects. It 
exposes a net economic benefit of around 2.5% (1/40 ratio) in terms of job prospects. 
                                                          
31
 See the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working and Living Conditions, ‘EMR case studies: The 
consequences of mergers and acquisitions’, 2008. 
11 
The above findings are limited to the period between 2013 and 2016 but do not include 
major economic shocks, for example, post-‘Brexit’32 job prospects. The majority of mergers 
have had a devastating impact on jobs, despite assumptions that labour costs are not to be 
seen as an incentive to merge. It could also be argued that in the long run, more jobs could 
eventually be created, but the facts have revealed the opposite. 
The vast majority of mergers notified to the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Competition are approved and, even where these approvals may be subject to conditions; 
thus, from 21 September 1990 to 31 August 2016, this accounted for an insignificant 
percentage (0.3%),33 that is, 25 blocked mergers out of a total of 6,299 notified mergers. A 
tiny fraction of mergers have been the subject of a prohibition decision under Article 8.3 of 
the EU Merger Control Regulation 139/2004. One good reason for a tempered criticism of 
the blocking of this tiny fraction is given by an American commentator, who recently noted 
that ‘indeed, the competition authorities of the European Commission (EC) have been even 
more aggressive in pursuing their enforcement agenda than have their U.S. counterparts’.34 
Other commentators have claimed that blocking a merger could eventually lead to the 
market exit of a poorly performing firm.35 
Historically, the introduction of European merger control rules led to controversy over 
whether this gap in the Treaty of Rome was left intentionally, with the purpose of a late 
introduction of a national industrial policy.36 The subsequent exploration of the historical 
roots of the Treaty provisions revealed that a later introduction of merger control had 
already been envisaged by the Spaak report.37 Koch concluded that in the 1950s, there was 
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simply no political appetite for merger control.38 This was felt to be beneficial, as, after many 
years of growing concentrations of power, calls followed to introduce merger control. As has 
already been explained, the economic regulation of mergers did not particularly harm the 
agglomeration of market power, as the overwhelming majority went ahead to obtain 
approval by the EU Commission. It is therefore doubtful that the enforcement has, indeed, 
achieved what was initially hoped for, namely, the keeping of near monopoly grown 
concentrations apart from each other. This constructive criticism goes hand in hand with 
pertinent evidence provided by economic experts. Upon the closer examination of thirteen 
mergers, Gore, Lewis, Lofaro, and Dethmers raised concerns over these mergers being 
ultimately cleared unconditionally, despite a clear picture that was indicative of dominance.39 
 
Date Country  Company  Sector  
New 
jobs 
Job losses 
05/04/2016  Ireland  Paddy Power  
Arts 
/entertainment  
0 250 
05/04/2016  
United 
Kingdom  
Paddy Power 
Betfair  
Arts / 
entertainment  
0 350 
15/03/2016  Sweden  Orbit One  Manufacturing  0 40 
16/02/2016  Germany  DZ Bank  Financial services  0 700 
01/02/2016  Netherlands  Vivat  Financial services  0 900 
25/01/2016  Ireland  Intuity  
Information / 
communication  
100 0 
14/12/2015  World  Shell  
Mining / 
quarrying  
0 2,800 
03/12/2015  Belgium  GlaxoSmithKline  Manufacturing  0 170 
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01/12/2015  France  
Société nationale 
Corse 
Méditerranée 
(SNCM) 
Transportation / 
storage  
0 583 
13/11/2015  France  Futurol  Construction  0 228 
30/10/2015  
United 
Kingdom  
Caparo  Manufacturing  0 43 
28/10/2015  Spain  LafargeHolcim  Manufacturing  0 99 
26/10/2015  France  Gérard Darel  Manufacturing  0 130 
21/10/2015  France  Brit Air  Transportation 0 66 
21/10/2015  Netherlands  Q8 Europoort  Manufacturing  0 100 
24/09/2015  France  3SI Holding  Retail  0 140 
11/09/2015  Sweden  SSAB  Manufacturing  0 270 
01/09/2015  Spain  Vodafone Spain  
Information / 
communication  0 
1,059 
31/08/2015  Austria  Baumax  Retail  0 400 
06/08/2015  World  Merck  Manufacturing  0 2,585 
21/07/2015  France  Alcatel Lucent EU  Manufacturing  0 83 
16/07/2015  France  Hop!  
Transportation / 
storage  0 
250 
09/07/2015  France  
L'Express-
Roularta  
Information / 
communication  0 
240 
25/06/2015  France  
La Dépêche - 
Journaux du Midi  
Information / 
communication  0 
350 
14 
25/06/2015  France  
La Dépêche - 
Journaux du Midi  
Information / 
communication  0 
300 
12/06/2015  Norway  Coop Norge  Retail  0 500 
29/05/2015  France  
Alma Consulting 
Group  
Professional 
services  
66 156 
19/05/2015  France  Lafarge  Manufacturing  37 166 
15/05/2015  Italy  Olivetti  Manufacturing  0 75 
05/05/2015  World  Lafarge  Manufacturing  37 380 
04/05/2015  Italy  Ansaldo Breda  Manufacturing  0 282 
29/04/2015  Spain  BBVA  Financial services  0 1,557 
28/04/2015  France  
Verreries de 
Manières  
Manufacturing  0 119 
24/03/2015  Poland  Alior Bank  Financial services  0 1,000 
09/03/2015  Italy  Firema Trasporti  Manufacturing  0 119 
05/03/2015  Poland  Bank BGŻ  Financial services  0 1,800 
26/02/2015  Germany  Noelke  Manufacturing  0 144 
19/02/2015  Croatia  OTP Bank  Financial services  0 124 
19/02/2015  France  
Abattoirs 
Industriels de la 
Manche  
Manufacturing  0 314 
15/01/2015  Spain  Barclays Bank  Financial services  0 975 
08/01/2015  Malta  
Autobuses de 
León (Malta 
Public Transport)  
Transportation / 
storage  
300 0 
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24/12/2014  France  Arc International  Manufacturing  150 550 
17/12/2014  
United 
Kingdom  
Dixons Carphone  Retail  0 400 
11/12/2014  Netherlands  Wegener  
Information / 
communication  0 
275 
11/12/2014  Finland  M-Brain  
Information / 
communication  0 
32 
05/12/2014  France  
Tilly Sabco 
Bretagne  
Manufacturing  0 118 
05/12/2014  Spain  Vodafone  
Information / 
communication  
0 1,000 
01/12/2014  France  Altia  Manufacturing  0 41 
01/12/2014  Germany  Sachtleben  Manufacturing  0 527 
19/11/2014  Germany  Hansa Group  Manufacturing  0 100 
11/11/2014  Germany  Riha Wesergold  Manufacturing  0 180 
29/10/2014  France  
Mobilier 
européen  
Retail  0 1,003 
27/10/2014  France  Caddie  Manufacturing  0 252 
24/10/2014  
United 
Kingdom  
Monarch Airlines  
Transportation / 
storage  0 
700 
18/10/2014  Germany  Telefónica  
Information / 
communication  0 
1,600 
16/10/2014  Netherlands  Ziggo  
Information / 
communication  0 
450 
07/10/2014  France  
Peugeot 
Motocycles  
Manufacturing  0 90 
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29/09/2014  France  Gad  Manufacturing  0 289 
17/09/2014  France  Isoa  Manufacturing  0 114 
16/09/2014  Spain  Orange  
Information / 
communication  0 
550 
05/09/2014  Germany  iSoft  
Information / 
communication  0 
70 
01/08/2014  Finland  
Starkki and 
Puukeskus  
Retail  0 100 
25/07/2014  France  CEIT  Manufacturing  0 131 
17/07/2014  World  Microsoft  
Information / 
communication  0 
18,000 
18/06/2014  France  Pixmania  Retail  0 187 
17/06/2014  Sweden  Sydsvenskan  
Information / 
communication  0 
160 
14/06/2014  Poland  Boryszew  Manufacturing  130 0 
06/06/2014  France  Jardiland  Retail  0 230 
30/04/2014  Italy  General Montaggi  Construction  0 100 
26/04/2014  Germany  
Gardner Denver 
Deutschland  
Manufacturing  0 87 
10/04/2014  France  
Manufacture 
vosgienne de 
meubles (MVM)  
Manufacturing  0 43 
31/03/2014  
United 
Kingdom  
Creative Foods  Manufacturing  0 149 
26/03/2014  France  
NextiraOne 
France  
Manufacturing  0 277 
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12/03/2014  Germany  
Bosch Solar 
Energy  
Manufacturing  0 350 
05/03/2014  Germany  
PBC Banking 
Services  
Financial services  0 300 
26/02/2014  France  Call Expert  
Administrative 
services  
0 507 
14/02/2014  Sweden  
Sparbanken 
Skane  
Financial services  0 200 
06/02/2014  France  Mory Ducros  
Transportation / 
storage  
0 2,850 
31/01/2014  France  Jean Caby  Manufacturing  0 120 
11/01/2014  Netherlands  Be Informed  
Information / 
communication  
0 
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29/11/2013  
United 
Kingdom  
Menzies Hotel  
Hotel / 
restaurants  
0 155 
28/11/2013  Germany  
Conergy 
SolarModule  
Manufacturing  0 80 
07/11/2013  Spain  Caja Badajoz  Financial services  0 193 
06/11/2013  Belgium  Mediahuis  
Information / 
communication  
0 138 
04/11/2013  
Czech 
Republic  
Telefonica Czech 
Republic  
Information / 
communication  
0 2,000 
30/10/2013  France  La Redoute  Retail  0 1,178 
30/10/2013  France  Europeenne Food  Retail  0 218 
22/10/2013  France  Calaire Chimie  Manufacturing  0 111 
30/09/2013  France  Sodetal  Manufacturing  0 173 
08/08/2013  Bulgaria  Ledenika  Manufacturing  300 0 
22/07/2013  Romania  
Autoritatea de 
Supraveghere 
Financiara  
Public 
administration 
and defence  
300 0 
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19/07/2013  France  Sony  Manufacturing  0 168 
25/06/2013  Austria  
Hutchison 3G 
Austria  
Information / 
communication  
0 170 
 
The European merger control rules were introduced in 1989, sixteen years after the 
presentation of a first draft proposal in 1973.40 The legal basis for the enactment of the 
merger regulation was Article 3 TEU in conjunction with Protocol 27 on the Internal Market 
and Competition, which seeks to safeguard undistorted competition within the internal 
market.41 However, a closer examination of the 26 years the notification system has been in 
existence shows the overall enforcement of this area remains relatively modest.  
The assessment of mergers has been based on legal and economic considerations, rather 
than the social impact that a particular merger might have, for example, on job prospects. 
Otherwise, the analysis of the so-called ‘efficiencies’ brought about by the proposed merger 
could have been endangered by political and social considerations, including job insecurity. 
There is no explicit recognition of the creation, loss, or maintenance of jobs in Regulation 
139/2004. Indeed, Article 21 (4) of this Regulation allows Member States to ‘take appropriate 
measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration by this 
Regulation and compatible with the general principles and other provisions of Community 
law’.  Comparatively, under the US antitrust law, the Bank Merger Act of 1966 offers a similar 
objective justification for disapproval of a merger where ‘the anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of 
the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served’.42 
Under the EU Merger Control Regulation, the protection of jobs could be seen to fall under 
the ambit of a ‘legitimate interest’. Another legal obstacle against this projection is the fact 
that Article 21 (4), second sentence, includes under the concept of ‘public interest’, ‘public 
security, plurality of the media and prudential rules’. This shortcoming could be overcome by 
reliance on the last paragraph of Article 21 (4), which mandates that ‘any other public 
interest’ be communicated to the Commission for an evaluation. However, blocking a merger 
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on the grounds of a social (public) interest would normally attract criticism for being based 
on pure politics, rather than on economic considerations. In any case, it has already been 
recognised that merger decisions are not merely legal, but also economic or political 
decisions.43 
Since the legitimacy of politics in merger control is at best as dubious as the perception of 
the immorality of politicians in the eyes of the general public, the search for the objective of 
competition policy could offer some useful insights into whether sociological aspects should 
necessarily concern economics. The primary objective of a ‘highly social market economy, 
aimed at full employment’ embedded in Article 3 (3) TEU44 could be usefully interpreted in 
conjunction with Article 21 (4) of the EU Merger Regulation. Secondary legislation could be 
applied in a constructive manner for the delivery of ‘full employment’ by clarifying that, ex 
post, following a merger implementation, new jobs must be created and existing ones cannot 
be eliminated to take advantage of cheaper labour, thereby resulting in social dumping. Most 
mergers rely on relocation to areas where a corporation can effectively cut down on labour 
costs, which contributes to a social phenomenon, known as dumping, being actively pursued, 
rather than discouraged. The case law of the European Court of Justice has recently referred 
to the phenomenon of social dumping. In his Opinion, Advocate General Wahl referred to 
‘provisions designed to prevent social dumping, which are negotiated and included in a 
collective agreement on behalf of and in the interests of workers’ and concluded that these 
provisions are ‘in principle to be regarded as improving directly their employment and 
working conditions’.45 The Advocate-General considered that it is for the competent court to 
‘determine whether there exists a real and serious risk of social dumping’.46 
One could also recall here that the general objective of the European Union is working for 
‘the sustainable development of Europe’. This is based on ‘balanced economic growth and 
price stability’ and ‘a highly competitive social market economy’, both of which represent the 
necessary layout for achieving sustainable development. Efficiency is not explicitly mentioned 
in the context of the above wider objectives, but has to be seen as a means to this end or as 
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‘part of this goal’.47 To exacerbate the drafting complexity of the Treaty of Lisbon, one could 
also add that the principle of ‘open markets with free competition’ based on an ‘efficient 
allocation of resources’ was mentioned under Article 119 TFEU.48 The latter provision has 
placed competition as an economic policy in the context of macroeconomics based on price 
stability, sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of 
payments. This kind of configuration makes competition an economic policy that integrates 
two sides of the same coin: micro-and macroeconomics.  
It can also be argued that the ideal of price and wage efficiency at microeconomic firm 
level is intertwined with macroeconomic principles of price stability and employment, 
including job creation. Furthermore, it is advanced that the ideal of price efficiency can never 
be maintained in the long run, for example, in the presence of inflation or of a huge public 
debt. Similarly, the requirement of Protocol 27 on ‘Internal Market and Competition’ that 
competition within the internal market should not be distorted cannot allow an uneven 
playing field of tax competition,49 whereby certain Member States will misuse tax incentives 
to attract foreign corporations through an extremely low tax base for corporate profits. 
Inevitably, this kind of competition based on tax levels, which could be seen in the Apple 
case,50 is never based on efficiency or merit alone. Rather, it dangerously distorts the 
macroeconomic principles based on free competition with open markets. It is also the first 
time that a Commissioner for Competition has chosen to tackle the massive inequality arising 
from extremely low taxed corporate profits. By setting an welcome precedent of this kind – 
to the despair of several commentators distraught at losing sight of economic efficiency for 
re-distributive taxation - the enforcement of competition ventures, indeed, into unchartered 
territory, but it does so bravely, as many more corporations could soon follow the same kind 
of much-needed treatment. Tackling this well-known distortion of competition through ‘tax 
competition’ has both the legitimacy and the support of Protocol 27 in conjunction with Title 
VII on ‘Common rules on Competition, taxation and approximation of laws’. Furthermore, the 
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avoidance of tax controls has also been recognised as one of the main reasons for engaging 
in vertical integration between downstream and upstream firms in order to achieve cost 
savings based on low corporate tax.51 
As in economics, where both industrial organization and macroeconomics draw dividing 
lines between price and wage efficiency, the EU framework deals with competition rules 
separately from social and employment law. This means that the fixation on efficiency could 
in theory deliver optimal outcomes when it comes to growth and productivity, but could be 
less helpful where it sacrifices employment and job prospects.  
In an attempt to address this shortcoming, one could look for integration provisions that 
could re-unite the two areas of concern to achieve a better balance between productivity 
and job creation. This classical solution seeks to identify a flanking or integration provision 
elsewhere in the Treaty.52  For example, Article 9 TEU requires that ‘in defining and 
implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked 
to the promotion of a high level of employment’. While the provision has been used in the 
context of European employment law, it can be argued that as an economic policy of the 
European Union, competition policy has to seek and actively promote at least a ‘high level of 
employment’ to reach the desired ‘highly competitive social market economy’. The social 
feature cannot be tied exclusively to social protection without firms or corporations being 
asked to behave responsibly when it comes to jobs. On the basis of the relevant data, a clear 
case can be made that competition policy has successfully been used to achieve economic 
growth while sacrificing the fair cost of labour. This finding is in line with Perrow’s critical 
assessment of mergers and takeovers as being motivated by power struggles among firms 
within and across markets and the conferral of ‘advantages that may have little to do with 
efficiency’.53 
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Another available avenue is making better sense of Article 151 TFEU, which mentions the 
promotion of employment aimed at ‘the development of human resources with a view to 
lasting high employment’.  
There are also weaknesses associated with an approach that could ensure competition 
policy be applied responsibly when it comes to asking businesses to create jobs. For example, 
job creation is encouraged in the context of small and medium-sized enterprises, but has 
never been de facto imposed or otherwise made conditional on monopolists. Similarly, the 
legal balancing of efficiencies as a result of a merger does not need to consider its resultant 
social impact. 
Although businesses cannot be expected to offer safeguards for jobs, which could 
eventually compromise productive efficiency and later harm consumers, there is a greater 
potential to block international mergers that could destroy local economies, lead to job 
losses, and amplify social inequality. Critics have argued that, similarly, a competition policy 
would enforce industrial policy and bring unwanted protectionism. This position is critical in 
the sense that it does nothing to address the negative impact of the sole fixation on 
efficiency, and it does not contribute to the social balance of the market economy. Other 
critics have seen a real conflict between economic efficiency and ‘the reduction of 
inequality’.54 They go on further to claim that the European Union’s low levels of economic 
growth and high unemployment are to be attributed to its ‘excessive concern with equality’, 
given the European ‘social welfare state’ and its ‘highly regulated labour markets’.55 Higher 
protection for employees has generally been blamed for the so-called labour market 
‘rigidities’. 56  I can only respectfully disagree on the earlier point when it comes to 
competition policy intervention; the European Union has rarely tackled issues surrounding 
inequality for the poor. It did so, however, for the rich when the previous Commission 
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injected billions of euros of state aid into banks, which were deemed to be too big to fail and 
so exit the market due to poor performance and management alike.57  
Ultimately, the historical analysis of the inception of the merger control rules reveals that 
the late introduction of these rules was due to the lack of consensus over the pursuit of non-
economic criteria in the assessment of mergers, in particular, the legal balancing of 
employment or other industrial policy considerations.58 A ‘politicisation’ of merger control 
was then feared,59 which has nevertheless happened in the following years.60 
Therefore, the case can be made that the silence with regard to jobs or unemployment in 
the EU Merger Regulation be properly acknowledged and that the legal balancing should not 
be based exclusively on industrial organization criteria without any further consideration of 
the social impact of the proposed merger.  
Nonetheless, the present state of the law is clear in the sense that competition law does 
not apply to labour relations. The considerations are strictly based on the special regulation 
of employment contracts. For example, a collective labour agreement that set minimum fees 
for the supply of independent services could not be challenged as anti-competitive under 
Article 101 TFEU.61 
From the interpretation of the available data on new jobs and cuts ex post mergers, it can 
be concluded that the assumption that ‘new jobs replace old jobs’ is a fallacy, with the 
exception of losses that could be justifiable due to technological change.62 
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V. The Macroeconomics of Wage Efficiency  
 
It is advanced that the disciplinary division between micro-and macroeconomics has 
contributed to the lack of a coordinated implementation of a competition policy that could 
actively seek to achieve both productivity and jobs. Having set lower prices as a target, 
competition policy has sought to achieve price efficiency by cutting down labour costs and 
hurting wage efficiency. Full employment translates into making more jobs available and, at 
the same time, by maintaining the wages at a lower level than under fierce competition for 
jobs, it creates stable market conditions for lower labour costs. And lower labour costs 
contribute directly towards lower prices for goods and services. 
As has been argued elsewhere,63 in a highly competitive EU labour market, a lower wage 
will not attract many workers, so employers will have to offer other employees a higher 
wage. As businesses have no interest in raising their own labour costs, inducing 
unemployment will be seen as positive, as it pushes wages further down. The perils of high 
unemployment are the existence of fierce competition for jobs with a high demand for jobs 
and a lower level of offers.  
However, there is an illusion of ‘real’ wages that are higher than these wages would have 
been during times of lower unemployment with normal competition for jobs, i.e., lower 
demand and higher numbers of offers. The argument that fierce competition for jobs 
rewards employees with higher wages is yet another fallacy. Employers could easily divest 
themselves of higher paid employees and cut down labour costs by hiring younger talent. 
This phenomenon has also been captured by Advocate-General Wahl when exposing the 
perils of social dumping by saying that this ‘phenomenon might occur through the immediate 
dismissal of workers or through gradual economisation by not replacing workers whose 
contract has come to an end’.64 In a nutshell, unemployment is the root of the problem, but 
not the solution.  
Advocate General Wahl referred to how ‘the elimination of wage competition between 
workers – which is in itself the very raison d’être for collective bargaining – implies that an 
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employer can under no circumstances hire other workers for a salary below that set out in 
the collective agreement’.65 
He went on to ask the following self-revealing question: ‘How could workers credibly ask 
for a salary increase if they knew that they could be easily and promptly replaced with self-
employed persons who would probably do the same job for a lower remuneration?’66 Similar 
to the abovementioned scenario, ‘wage efficiency’ cannot be taken to represent the ‘real’ 
but rather an artificial wage since a larger percentage of the active workforce is never fully 
employed. 
The current rhetoric found in mainstream micro-and macroeconomic textbooks is in sharp 
contrast to real-life scenarios: first, jobs are restructured at a higher rate than they are being 
created and, second, higher unemployment creates only an impression of higher ‘real’ wages 
than those possibly available under full employment, i.e., perfect labour competition. 
  
VI. The Macroeconomic Outlook of Full Employment  
 
Over the years, the statistics offered by Eurostat have raised several concerns over 
unemployment figures which, from a total of 508 million European Union citizens, amounted 
to an overall 21.651 million, and to 16.634 million in the Eurozone area.67  
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Objectively, the proportion of unemployed in the EU represented 4.26% of the total 
population, but this proportion is greater when considering the active population. 68 
According to the latest data by Eurostat, the employment rate was 64.9%. It follows that 
30.84% are not in full employment due to reasons of age, i.e., too young or retired. A few 
Member States, namely, Germany (4.3%), the Czech Republic (4.5%), and the UK (5.0%), 
were in full employment as of January 2016, while the remaining Member States displayed 
higher unemployment, with the worst conditions clearly evidenced in Spain (20.4%) and 
Greece (24%).69 
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Looking at the wider picture from 2004 to 2015, Germany had a higher level of 
unemployment in the period from 2004 to 2010, fluctuating from 11.2% in 2005 to 7.0% in 
2010, but it addressed the issue, moving towards full employment from 2011 with 5.8%, and 
effectively reaching full employment at 4.6% in 2015. In contrast, the UK was in a better 
position, as it had full employment in the period from 2004 to 2008 with fluctuations from 
the lowest level of 4.7% in 2004 to 5.8% in 2008 and had relatively higher levels of 
unemployment in the following period from 8.1% in 2010 to 6.1% in 2014, reaching 5.3% in 
2015. The UK’s situation is comparable with that of the US in the sense that higher levels of 
unemployment dominated the years of the financial crisis from 2009 to 2013 with relatively 
higher levels of unemployment, which reached a peak of 9.6% in 2010, but it has been 
moving slowly towards full employment in the last three years (5.3% in 2015). 
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Taking into account the existing disparities in the economic development throughout the 
European Union, the target of full employment has not been met since 2004. As can be seen 
from the table above, it has constantly been the case that the EU unemployment figures 
stagnated around 9%. In fact, the average unemployment rate for the period from 2004 to 
2015 was 9.16% and was only slightly higher in the Eurozone area at 9.81%. In contrast, in 
the US, the target has been met with the exception of the financial crisis period, when from 
2009 to 2013, the average unemployment rate stood at 8.66%.  
Are there any signs of recovery? The above figures would suggest that, based on the top 
performing economies of the UK and Germany, the full employment target was met in 2015 
in Germany (4.6%) and nearly met in the UK and the US (5.3%). Critics can contradict an 
exaggerated optimism, as the target has seen modest improvement at 9.4% for the EU and 
10.9% in the Eurozone. However, exaggerated pessimism is equally inappropiate, given that 
these figures represent an EU average of 28 Member States, including two severely 
depressed economies, i.e., Greece (24.5%) and Spain (22.1%), as well as the worst 
performing economies, including France (16.3%), Croatia (16.3%), Cyprus (15%), and Portugal 
(12.6). From the former Eastern European block, with 6.8%, Romania outperforms two 
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Nordic states, Sweden (7.4%) and Finland (9.4%), at job creation. Given the UK’s decision to 
exit from the EU, there might be further signs of optimism for continental Europe should 
major international corporations re-locate there and bring an influx of jobs and, as a result, 
address the present imbalance in certain Member States of the EU. A ‘hard’ exit could bring a 
grey prospect and make it impossible for the UK to maintain its already met target of full 
employment. Therefore, ‘Brexit’ could soften the EU’s overall unemployment rate through 
newly gained jobs. 
The present picture demonstrates that the EU has not yet successfully delivered on its 
social market economy promise, as it created and maintained clusters of job opportunities in 
the most influential Member States, which have traditionally been seen as open to economic 
migration and social dumping. Therefore, the EU must learn its lesson the hard way. Taking 
the UK as an example, the level of economic development has been uneven, with record 
numbers of jobs being created in the city of London and fewer opportunities in the rest of 
the country. Making access to jobs evenly spread throughout the EU could have also reduced 
the burden of economic migration on public services and prevented the existence of top and 
bottom performers.  
One could also argue that the UK has been the victim of its own economic success and the 
influential status it has achieved inside the EU during its forty-three years of membership, as 
while it has been incapable of re-distributing these economic benefits within the UK, it has 
been unwilling to pass on some of these opportunities to other Member States. There is no 
active economic migration in the absence of full employment: create unemployment and all 
talented workers will leave the economy while productivity stagnates. 
In conclusion, competition policy should actively focus on the delivery of new jobs instead 
of being blindly fixated on economic efficiency. This does not mean tolerating inefficient 
firms; rather, it means asking those firms to redistribute a higher percentage of their 
corporate profits towards creating new jobs and maintaining existing ones where firms 
decide to merge.  
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VII. Conclusion  
 
This paper has sought to close the gap between the perfect competition ideal of price and 
wage efficiency by de-constructing the meaning of efficiency from both a micro-and a 
macroeconomics perspective. As a real-life scenario, the case of mergers and acquisitions has 
been used to illustrate how the reality of newly created jobs is not on a par with job losses. In 
the context of mergers, this paper has identified the need for a major overhaul of the 
efficiency defence with the aim of focusing more actively on job creation, or at least on 
balancing the number of job cuts with the number of newly created jobs. 
Ultimately, this paper arrives at the conclusion that the ideal wage efficiency is not one 
that aspires to very high wages associated with higher levels of unemployment, but one that 
seeks to actively address full employment. The latter will enhance the working conditions of 
the employed workers, although it also offers the opportunity for wages to be pushed further 
down. In this respect, a viable alternative has to be a pragmatic balance between fierce and 
aggressive competition (higher wages) and little or no competition (lower wages). A ‘highly 
competitive social market economy’ cannot be successful in delivering the desired market 
outcome of full employment if the foundations of microeconomics are not set up to actively 
encourage the creation of new jobs. 
 
 
